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The Voting Rights Amendment Act1 (VRAA), recently introduced 
in the House by Representatives Sensenbrenner and Conyers and in 
the Senate by Senator Leahy is a valiant effort to save the Voting 
Rights Act2 (VRA), an iconic statute that many of us have called a 
superstatute.3  The VRAA is a response to the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Shelby County v. Holder,4 which struck down section 4(a) of 
the VRA, the provision that identified the jurisdictions that needed to 
submit or preclear their proposed changes prior to implementation, 
under section 5 of the Act, to the Department of Justice or the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia. 
But even assuming that the bill becomes law, the VRA as amended 
by the VRAA will at best be a pale shadow of its former self.  Sections 
4(a) and 5 of the VRA, prior to the Court’s decision in Shelby County, 
applied, in whole or in part, to fifteen states.  The VRAA proposes a 
new coverage formula, which applies to states that have “persistent 
[and] extremely low minority turnout” and have committed five voting 
rights violations in a fifteen-year period.5  Under this new formula the 
VRAA would apply to four states: Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and 
Texas.  This is the most that the Democrats in Congress believe that 
they can get the Republicans to agree on and it is uncertain — and 
many are skeptical — that this bill can become law. 
Unfortunately, the VRAA attempts to capture, as much as possible, 
the regulatory framework that was in place for the latter part of the 
twentieth century.  If the VRAA will become law, recapturing some el-
ements of the past seems to be the only point of bipartisan agreement.  
The VRAA does not even begin to capture the voting problems of to-
day — such as photo voter identification requirements, which are ex-
plicitly exempted from the VRAA.  
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In addition, in at least one respect, the VRAA is a step backwards.  
It compels supporters of voting rights to file suit against the states and 
litigate extensively in order to show that a voting rights violation has 
occurred.  This is one reason that some civil rights groups have ex-
pressed misgivings about the VRAA, otwithstanding the extreme pres-
sure for all groups to support the Amendment.  Moreover, as Professor 
Ellen Katz argues in her commentary in this Forum, the VRAA is vul-
nerable under the Court’s Boerne doctrine in a way that the VRA  
never was.6 
Perhaps more importantly, the VRAA does not have much to say 
about looming voting rights issues such as proof-of-citizenship re-
quirements.  Consider this question in greater detail.  In a recent deci-
sion, the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas ruled that the 
Election Assistance Commission (EAC) does not have the statutory au-
thority to preclude the States of Arizona and Kansas from demanding 
that voters interested in registering to vote in federal elections, through 
the National Voter Registration Act, prove that they are citizens of the 
United States.7  The court ordered the EAC to immediately modify the 
federal voter registration form to include the proof-of-citizenship lan-
guage demanded by the states.8 
As with many electoral rules, proof-of-citizenship requirements 
have a disproportionate impact on some identifiable groups of voters.  
In this case, the voters most likely to be impacted are poor voters and 
voters of color.  By some accounts, more than 10,000 voters in Kansas 
have been unable to vote because they have not been able to provide 
proof of citizenship.9  Similarly, when Arizona enacted its proof-of-
citizenship requirement, tens of thousands of voters (by one account 
over 30,000) were unable to vote, notwithstanding the fact that the 
vast majority of the affected voters were United States citizens.10  
Among the group of voters that was disproportionately impacted by 
Arizona’s proof-of-citizenship requirement, Latino voters, not surpris-
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ingly, were overrepresented.11  Latino voters have some of the lowest 
registration rates in many parts of the country, including Arizona, 
where only about forty-four percent of Latino citizens are registered as 
compared to over sixty-eight percent registration rate for white vot-
ers.12 
In many respects, proof of citizenship is the new voter identifica-
tion requirement.  Just as many state legislatures that were controlled 
by the Republican Party started implementing rules requiring photo 
voter identification — in fact, the only states that have implemented 
voter photo identification requirements have been those controlled by 
the Republican Party — we are likely to see a new wave of proof-of-
citizenship requirements sweep across the country, in those legislatures 
that are Republican-controlled.  Georgia has already requested that the 
EAC modify the federal voter registration form to reflect the fact that 
Georgia requires its voters to produce proof of citizenship.13 
But the VRAA has nothing to say about these issues.  Though the 
VRAA may be the best offer on the table and though its purpose is 
laudable, it is at best an extremely modest statute. 
In this respect, it is worth drawing attention to the fact that the 
original Voting Rights Act was an unusual statute.  The Voting Rights 
Act of 1965, hard fought as it was and even though it dragged the 
Democratic Party in the South kicking and screaming into the twenti-
eth century, represented a legal and public policy consensus on the 
need to eradicate first-generation barriers to racial equality in voting.  
In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,14 Chief Justice Warren referred to 
the legislation as “stringent,”15  “inventive”16 and “uncommon.”17  The 
Act posed a “basic” constitutional question: “has Congress exercised its 
powers under the Fifteenth Amendment in an appropriate manner 
with relation to the States?”18  This meant, he continued, that “[a]s 
against the reserved powers of the States, Congress may use any ra-
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tional means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition of racial dis-
crimination in voting.”19 
The Act was unusual not simply because it was “inventive” or “un-
common.”  It was unusual because it gave rise to and then reflected a 
broad consensus with respect to the need to eliminate racial discrimi-
nation in voting.  In Katzenbach, the Court aligned itself with that 
consensus while at the same time legitimating the VRA.  Under 
Katzenbach, the VRA would remain in good constitutional standing 
for only as long as the justices understood American society as rife 
with racism. 
Fast-forward to the recent Shelby County case.  The majority opin-
ion in Shelby County essentially declared that the work of the VRA, 
eliminating racial barriers to voting by the states, has essentially been 
completed.  Consequently, the Court did not think that Congress could 
justify the then-existing formula in light of current circumstances.  The 
Shelby County opinion is best understood as a policy document — ar-
guably, no more or less of a policy statement than Katzenbach — a 
statement by the conservative majority on the Court that it disagrees 
with Congress about the nature and scope of voting rights law.  
The question is: Where should voting rights law and policy proceed 
from here?  On a first pass, this is an easy question to answer, as there 
is no shortage of suggestions for a new coverage formula and possible 
directions for voting rights policy.  The task is simply to choose among 
the various offerings.  More poignantly, the VRAA, the current offer on 
the table, reflects a choice and the likely direction of the near future. 
But upon deeper examination, it is likely the case that a new con-
sensus over the future of voting rights policy will elude us for a very 
long time.  Voting rights policy is in a moment of transition and there 
is currently no consensus in the political process on how to move vot-
ing rights policy forward.  Voting rights law and policy are currently 
caught between two different ideological visions.  For some, law and 
policy, including constitutional law, ought to remove all barriers that 
impose any significant or meaningful burden on the right to vote.  For 
others, states have the power and the responsibility to enact voting 
laws to assure that only legitimate voters participate in the political 
process.  These positions are both ideological and partisan.  Conserva-
tives and Republicans tend to favor state laws ensuring the responsible 
exercise of the right to vote.  Liberals and Democrats tend to favor 
laws that maximize political participation and self-government.  Voting 
rights law and policy are caught between both visions. 
This ideological and partisan divide is one reason that Congress 
has proven, so far, to be incapable of responding to Shelby County.  
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Congress could have greeted the Court’s decision in Shelby County 
with disdain because the Court struck down an act of Congress, a co-
equal branch.  Shelby County could have reasonably been viewed as a 
symbol of a showdown between Congress and the Court about a ma-
jor public policy initiative.   
But the institutional lens is neither the most compelling explanato-
ry variable for the Court’s decision in Shelby County nor does it  
explain Congress’s response to Shelby County.  The Court’s decision is 
best understood not in institutional terms, but in ideological terms.  
Congress’s putative response, in the form of the VRAA, is also best 
understood in partisan and ideological terms.  Shelby County tapped 
into the ideological and partisan divide that currently exists in voting 
rights law and policy. 
To the extent that the VRAA is weak and anemic, as Professor 
Katz intimates,20 the VRAA’s weakness is a reflection of both the con-
straint imposed by the Court in Shelby County — the need to update 
the coverage formula to reflect current circumstances — and the parti-
san divide — making voting as easy as possible as against assuring 
that voting is exercised responsibly by eligible citizens.  The VRAA is 
an attempt to craft a bipartisan compromise that fits narrowly be-
tween both positions. 
In our view, voting rights activists ought not settle for the valiant 
but modest effort that is the VRAA.  An extremely narrow, modest, 
and constitutionally vulnerable statute, born of the supposed need for 
political compromise, is not worth fighting for.  Rather, civil rights ac-
tivists should engage the political process to build a new vision that 
encompasses racial equality in voting.  What is needed is a new voting 
rights movement that takes as its goal the need to build a consensus 
over broad universal political participation.  This new consensus will 
have to be, necessarily, forged along ideological and maybe even parti-
san lines.  Eventually, one view will prevail. 
In North Carolina, as a consequence of laws passed by the state 
that limit voting rights, citizens have started to build such a grassroots 
movement.  They call it Moral Mondays.  The movement has spread 
from North Carolina to Georgia and South Carolina.21  The Moral 
Mondays movement may ultimately fizzle out.  But the movement is 
an example of the type of political and social movement that ought to 
capture the attention of voting rights activists. 
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The VRAA is but a temporary way station.  It need not be the final 
destination for voting rights policy.  Voting rights activists ought to 
strive to build consensus in favor of broad participation rights by citi-
zens.  Such a movement would be a worthy heir to the majestic Voting 
Rights Act of 1965. 
